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Abstract Access to seed is crucial for farming, though few
studies investigate household-level access in the informal
‘farmer seed systems’ which still supply most seed in poor
countries. This paper uses empirical data of seed exchange
practices for sorghum in eastern Ethiopia to analyze how
social relationships influence access to off-farm seed for a
major crop. Seed shortfalls are common, and farmer–farmer
exchange is important for providing locally-adapted seed to
fill this gap, but access varies considerably among house-
holds, also affecting quantities supplied and terms of
exchange. Preferred sources for off-farm seed (neighbors,
government, market) also vary among farmers, reflecting
agroecology and asset-ownership, but also differing access
to these sources. Social network theories highlight the
importance of reciprocal ties, and the cultural norms
underpinning them, in accessing seed. These cultural norms
are contested, with some claiming that commercial trans-
actions are increasingly common. Implications for inter-
ventions supporting farmer seed systems, particularly
emergency seed aid, are discussed in relation to the
socially-mediated nature of seed access.
Keywords Social networks . Resource access . Mutual aid .
Seed systems . Emergency seed aid . Ethiopia . Sorghum
Introduction
As the fundamental input for agriculture, seed is a key
resource. The physical health and genetic traits embodied in
seed affect crop performance throughout the season. Thus,
secure access to seed is a key concern for farmers. Despite
considerable investment,1 formal-sector seed supply has had
little impact in most developing countries due to market
failure or inappropriate policies (Cromwell 1996; Tripp
2001). In most countries, the vast majority of seed still
comes from farmers themselves and other informal channels
used by farmers (Sperling and Cooper 2003). These ‘farmer
seed systems’ have received increased attention in the past
decade, especially as potential partners for more farmer-
participatory approaches to seed supply (Almekinders and
Louwaars 1999) or crop breeding (Cleveland and Soleri
2002; McGuire et al. 1999). Increasingly, emergency
assistance also seeks to support farmer seed systems in order
to assist agricultural recovery following a crisis (Sperling et
al. 2004). Thus, farmer seed systems are at the centre of a
range of contemporary relief and development interventions.
However, effective support has been hampered by poor
understanding of these seed systems. Limited knowledge of
how farmers learn about and access seed can mean that
useful crop varieties do not reach all farmers (McGuire et
al. 1999), or that emergency seed relief efforts are
misdirected (Jones et al. 2002). Most studies of farmer
seed systems focus on technical aspects, such as farmers’
knowledge and practices for maintaining seed physical or
genetic quality. However, seed systems are also social
systems, where key practices, particularly seed exchange
among farmers, are affected by local norms and social
relationships. Few studies consider these social dimensions,
and most of these describe aggregated practices or general
norms. In contrast, this paper analyzes actual seed exchange
events and individual opinions, using empirical detail to
show how access varies among households, and how social
relationships can diverge from normative ideals. This
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1 For instance, the FAO supported seed system development projects
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supply reforms in 40 sub-Saharan African countries (Scowcroft and
Polack Scowcroft 1999).
develops a richer and more disaggregated account of seed
access than more generalized approaches.
This study examines practices around sorghum (Sorghum
bicolor [L.] Moench.), the major crop in two contrasting
agroecological zones in a chronically-stressed region of
eastern Ethiopia. Repeated sowing of sorghum is a key
strategy for coping with variable rainfall, leading to a large
and somewhat unpredictable seed demand. Seed saved by a
household does not always meet this demand, so off-farm
seed is important in filling this gap; in the 1998 season, for
instance, at least a third of farmers obtained seed from
elsewhere (McGuire 2007). This paper considers how social
relationships mediate access to this key resource, using
social network theories to explore these relationships.
Access to seed varies considerably between households,
and greater awareness of how this affects transaction costs
(and other costs) around seed exchange can assist inter-
ventions in supporting farmer seed systems. Moreover,
analyzing social networks helps to understand whether
changing seed exchange practices reflect exogenous factors,
such as repeated environmental stress, or more general shifts
in cultural norms of support.
The next section highlights why access to seed is
important for understanding seed dissemination in farmer
seed systems, and briefly reviews social network theories on
reciprocal support. Methods are summarized following a
description of the study sites. Empirical data on household-
level seed management, exchange, and preferred sources of
off-farm seed are used to ground a discussion of social
relationships and their influence on access to seed. These
relationships highlight the role of culture in access to this key
resource, showing how a household’s access varies accord-
ing to its ties to potential donors and its social standing. The
discussion explores implications for interventions supporting
farmer seed systems, particularly emergency seed aid.
Social Relations in Seed Supply
Social relationships can shed important light on seed
exchange, which affects the movement and use of diversity
in farmer seed systems, as well as farmers’ access to off-farm
seed following loss. Regarding the utilization of crop genetic
diversity, a predominant view is that the range of crop
varieties found on farms—whether Modern Varieties (MVs)
produced by formal breeding, or Farmer Varieties (FVs)
developed or maintained within the farmer seed system—
mainly reflects farmers’ demand for different traits (agro-
nomic, maturity, food quality, etc.) found in these varieties
(Teshome et al. 1999; Bellon 1996). This assumes that there
are few barriers to exchange, and that farmers have easy
access to a wide range of diversity when building variety
portfolios. However, this assumption is rarely tested. A
review for East and Central Africa identified numerous
examples where social barriers constrained farmer–farmer
exchange of bean seed, hindering the spread of new cultivars
(David and Sperling 1999). Bellon (2004) suggests that
weakening of social ties among farmers can increase their
transaction costs for learning about and obtaining new
diversity, and argues that in some instances diversity use
can be shaped by supply rather than demand. Thus, social
ties among farmers may influence the dissemination of seed,
and the distribution of diversity (FV or MV) more generally.
In a similar vein, recent studies highlight the significance
of access to seed for recovery from an environmental or
conflict-related emergency. Though emergency seed aid
often assumes that seed is locally unavailable following a
crisis, recent evidence indicates that sufficient seed actually
is locally-available in most situations. Rather, the main
problem farmers face is gaining access to this seed
(Sperling et al. 2003; Remington et al. 2002; Jones et al.
2002). Again, social ties likely affect farmers’ access to
various sources, which has important implications for post-
disaster assistance. However, the social dimensions of seed
access have received little empirical study.
Seed system studies often highlight the importance of
farmer–farmer seed exchange for supporting household
seed security and fostering innovation (e.g. Sperling and
Loevinsohn 1993; Louette et al. 1997). Such exchange
often falls under mutual-aid, associated with local norms
for supporting neighbors and kin. However, beyond these
norms, who actually has access to seed is poorly-under-
stood in most contexts. Only a few studies have examined
access to seed (e.g. Badstue et al. 2006; Cleveland and
Murray 1997; Dhamotharan et al. 1997), though these
generally do not focus on details of specific seed exchange
events. Commentators have often noted that those frequent-
ly needing off-farm seed (the ‘chronically seed-insecure’)
tend to be the poorest and most vulnerable farmers, while
regular seed donors often include better-off farmers
(Richards 1990; Cromwell 1996; Dhamotharan et al.
1997). Such social segmentation suggests that seed ex-
change may sometimes fit in with other structural relations
of power, which may influence who is able to receive seed.
Besides the ability to obtain seed, other important aspects
of access include quantities, timing of supply, physical
health, genetic quality, and terms of supply (e.g. as a gift, or
in exchange for cash or other future services). Finally,
norms underpinning seed exchange are not fixed but may
be altered by other social changes. For instance, conflict in
Sierra Leone and Rwanda disrupted social ties, meaning
that farmers are now less willing to exchange seed than in
the past (Sperling 1997; Richards et al. 1997), and
diversification away from agriculture leaves Mexican farm-
ers less time to invest in building social ties with other
farmers, consequently limiting their access to seed via
farmer–farmer exchange (Bellon 2004). Though harmoni-
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ous representations of ‘community’ norms may persist
(particularly in the populist assumptions of outsiders;
Cooke and Kothari 2001), current norms of support may
be rather different in practice.
The above review raises a number of questions for seed
systems analysis. Does seed exchange reflect other relation-
ships between supplier and recipient? Might cultural
changes, arising from other changes such as the (albeit
modest) expansion of the cash economy in rural Ethiopia,
affect norms and practices around such exchanges? And
what are the implications of (shifting) social relations on the
accessibility of different seed sources, particularly for the
poorest farmers? Social network theories can help explore
questions around informal market relationships. These are
reviewed briefly below, in order to frame the analysis of seed
exchange, cultural norms of support, and access to seed.
Social Network Theories
A range of theories address exchanges within social
networks, and how these exchanges relate to relationships
of power. These theories offer useful lenses for understand-
ing seed exchange as part of a wider set of relationships.
Goran Hyden (1980) describes an ‘Economy of Affection,’
where enduring reciprocal ties bind society together. These
ties redistribute resources to some degree, but also trade
material support for status or clients. A recent update argues
that these ties are “fluid and opportunistic” (2006: 77)
rather than rigid and principled, and suggests that powerful
actors derive more benefit from these ties. The absence of
formal rules or institutions around reciprocal aid allow for
unequal exchange relationships, as the party with more
structural power sometimes is able to withhold rewards.
Sara Berry (1989, 1992, 1993) also emphasizes structural
power in analyzing social exchange networks. She argues
that farmers invest in mutual aid to strengthen relationships
and raise their status to help gain favorable access to factors
of production. This is especially important for accessing
land, she argues, since complex and changing rules around
the control of land mean that rights to land are often
debated; support from social networks can help build a
claim. James Scott’s (1976) ‘Moral Economy’ posits that
poorer households depend on support of patrons even if the
overall arrangement is unfavorable to them, since patronage
can help guarantee a basic level of subsistence. He argues
that where support from patrons has declined (for instance
where patrons could depend on markets or the state for
support, and thus have less need of support from their
poorer neighbors), the poor have resisted these changes
with moral appeals to a tradition of reciprocal aid. Thus, in
contrast to Hyden or Berry, he emphasizes cultural norms
rather than structure, and suggests that the poor have the
greatest interest in maintaining these norms.
Hyden and Berry are useful reminders that unequal
power relationships may underlie social exchange, despite
norms of mutual aid. However, their framings focus largely
on structure, suggesting that agency lies largely with
wealthier individuals and that reciprocal exchange mainly
relates to accumulation. Scott’s Moral Economy approach
brings culture more to the fore, though critics question the
centrality of norms, and argue that his account is too static
(Haggis et al. 1986; Popkin 1979). Scott’s later study
(1985) of a Malaysian rice-farming community responded
to these critiques, showing that appeals to norms of
exchange were at the heart of an intense intra-community
struggle over the degree and terms of reciprocal support.
The advantage of this later framing is that it highlights
cultural agency within social exchange. Culture can
influence behavior in its own right, though it is a dynamic
and contested terrain, where different groups press their
own visions of socially just relations (Bailey 1991).
Materials and Methods
The study took place over 12 months of the 1998–1999
cropping season in the West Harerghe Zone of the Oromiya
Region in eastern Ethiopia. Two adjacent districts (Woredas)
were compared, representing distinct agroecologies. Chiro,
in the mountainous highlands, has generally reliable rainfall
Table 1 Key Characteristics of
Miesso and Chiro Districts
(Woredas)
a ICRA 1996; b Climate Data
at Miesso Station (Both
Covering Early 1980s to
Mid-1990s); and c Survey in
1998 (With Standard Errors)
Characteristic District
Chiro Miesso
Elevation (masl) 1,500–2,500 1,300–1,500
Topography Steep slopes and wide valley bottoms Flat to undulating
Temperature (°C) 15–25a 23–31b
Population ha−1 2.16a 0.47a
Mean farm size (ha) 0.64 (0.04)c 1.27 (0.11)c
Households with 0/1/2 oxen (%) 39/26/34c 40/32/28c
Rainfall (mm) 650–1,000a 420–960b
Rainfall onset More certain Less certain
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with long growing seasons, though population densities are
high and soil fertility problems common. Miesso, on a
lowland plain, has more variable rainfall onset and shorter
seasons; drought and pests are the main constraints (Table 1).
Cultivation has dominated West Harerghe since the
introduction of the ox-plough in the 16th Century (McCann
1995), and most farmers there are Oromo Muslims. A
minority (<10%) are Amhara Orthodox Christians,
descendants of migrants from northern Ethiopia in the last
century. Few Amhara farmers are associated with the now-
defunct landlord class, and all are well-integrated into local
institutions along with their Oromo neighbors (e.g. edir, for
labor-sharing). There are no obvious wealth differences
between Oromo and Amhara farmers, though the latter
appear to have better ties to relatives in urban employment.
Research focused on a single Farmers’ Association (FA,
smallest administrative unit, roughly 1,000 households) in
each district. Semi-structured interviews with 57 Chiro and
84 Miesso farmers helped develop a picture of seed
exchange, pursued in more depth with focus group
discussions in each community—some held separately for
well-off and poorer farmers. A subset of contact farmers
(ten in Chiro, ten in Miesso), representing different wealth
levels, were regularly visited. Finally, a formal survey of 41
Chiro and 53 Miesso farmers from wider areas of both
districts sought quantitative detail on seed access and
exchange, placing FA-based work in a wider context. For
simplicity, data are referred to by source—interviews,
surveys, contact farmers, or focus group discussions.
Sample sizes for some quantitative results were modest, since
these reflected seed exchange events for a single season, and
some questions (e.g. ‘least preferred seed source’) did not
have full response rates. Relating these results to qualitative
data from other sources helped extrapolate findings and draw
more robust conclusions. Inquiry focused on household heads,
who claim responsibility for seed security. Between six and
ten percent of households are female-headed (ICRA 1996),
and all sample sets included female-headed households.
Details of women’s particular roles in seed security (e.g. seed
storage and management in the home), or of intra-household
negotiation over decisions—while clearly important—were
beyond the scope of this study. Statistical analysis used SPSS
to compare means, using t-tests, ANOVAs, and Tukey post-
hoc tests. Other key informants included agricultural
researchers, Ministry of Agriculture personnel, and Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) staff working in the
region.
Seed Management and Seed Security
Emergency seed aid has occurred in Ethiopia virtually every
year since 1974, with NGO and government agencies request-
ing US$15m in 2003 (Mburathi et al. 2003). West Harerghe is
considered highly vulnerable to poor harvests and seed
insecurity (e.g. Piguet 2003), and seed assistance has been
implemented in this region in at least eight of the past 10 years
(T. Shiferew, personal communication, 2005). Seed assistance,
however, is based on food security assessments rather than on
an understanding of how farmers maintain seed security. This
section summarizes some key aspects of seed management.
Mixed farming systems predominate in West Harerghe,
using oxen for tillage. Rainfall is bimodal, with a short
period (belg) in March–April followed by more substantial
rain between June and September (kremt). Use of external
inputs is very limited, sorghum MV adoption is low (<3%),
and a diverse array of FVs (usually landraces) dominate in
the region (McGuire 2005). Sorghum is sown with the belg
rains and matures 8–9 months later. Deep planting (10–15
cm with ox-ploughs; Goe 1999), heavy soils, moisture
stress and pest attack can constrain seedling development,
so sowing rates are high (15 kg ha−1 or more) to increase
the chance of establishing an even stand. In addition,
rainfall onset is often uncertain, so many farmers sow
repeatedly at the start of the season, to increase their chance
of establishing their sorghum crop. Despite these practices,
early sowings can still fail completely if belg rains are very
poor, or pest attack severe—which occurs frequently in the
lowlands. When this happens, many farmers seek fast-
maturing sorghum varieties for the main kremt rains. Few
Ethiopian FVs mature quickly, so farmers generally need to
obtain MVs or material derived from MVs for late sowings.
The farming system raises several issues for seed
security. Firstly, sowing practices demand a sizeable
quantity. Households vary considerably in the amount of
seed saved: a few farmers regularly save 100 kg or more,
though others save as little as 2 kg, prioritizing consump-
tion or immediate sale. Those saving little seed are more
likely to be regularly seed insecure, as they have little
scope for resowing should problems arise. However,
erratic rainfall or other problems can consume the seed
stocks of a wide range of farmers: a third of all
respondents needed off-farm seed in 1998. Secondly,
lowland farmers face greater challenges in meeting seed
needs, as plots are significantly larger, yields lower, and
rainfall more unpredictable. Thirdly, farmers often need to
obtain off-farm seed at short notice to be able to sow when
rains (whether belg or kremt) resume. Formal supply of
sorghum seed is limited and generally late, so other
farmers and informal markets fill this gap. Finally, house-
holds saving large amounts of seed are important seed
sources, as they are more likely to have spare seed for
neighbors in need. For instance, among the contact
farmers, those who supplied seed to others saved signif-
icantly more than others (Table 2). Many of those saving
very large amounts (100 or even 200 kg of seed) stated
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they intended to give any surplus seed to neighbors—once
their own plots were established.
Farmer–farmer exchange was the most frequent source
of off-farm seed, though markets were used for larger
individual amounts (>15 kg). Most farmer–farmer ex-
change was between unrelated farmers: only in three of
23 cases mentioned in interviews was seed supplied from a
relative (data not shown).
Table 3 compares traits from surveyed households
according to whether they supplied or received seed in
1998. Those who received seed in Miesso expect signifi-
cantly less yield or production in poor years, compared with
other Miesso farmers. In contrast, Chiro recipients did not
appear to be distinct in any clear manner, though this may
be because late rains in the 1997 harvest spoiled seed for a
wide cross-section of farmers in the highlands. Seed
suppliers in both districts reached 4–5 others on average
in 1998, and expected significantly higher production in
both good and bad years. Miesso suppliers had significantly
more land and oxen. The different level of harvest security
between suppliers and recipients suggests that these are
distinct groups that endure over time, in part due to
differences in levels of assets. The ‘age’ of seed stocks in
Table 3 supports this interpretation, indicating significant
differences in seed security between donors and recipients.
The survey asked when farmers last had to replace the seed
stock for each sorghum variety with off-farm seed (or, if
they claimed they never replaced this seed stock, when that
variety was introduced to the farm). The ‘age’ of seed
stocks averages the time since replacement for all varieties
grown on a farm (mean was 1.4 varieties). This approach
estimates the frequency of involuntary loss and subsequent
replacement of a seed stock, rather than partial refreshing.
Recipients of off-farm seed in 1998 had significantly
‘younger’ seed stocks, and donors ‘older’ stocks, indicating
different rates of seed stock turnover. These findings
suggest that roles in seed exchange are somewhat stable,
with one group regularly needing seed, and another group
often having seed to give to others. The implications of
recurrent donor-recipient relationships are discussed in the
section on ‘seed exchange and social networks.’
Seed Source Preferences
Farmers were asked in the survey to indicate which seed
source (from other farmers, local merchants, or government)
they preferred the most and the least, if their own stocks
were exhausted. Responses diverged by agroecology, reflect-
ing different concerns between the highlands and lowlands
Table 2 Mean Amounts (With Standard Errors) of Sorghum Seed
Saved by Contact Farmers at the End of the 1998/99 Season, in
Relation to Sorghum Area Farmed
Category of farmers Chiro Miesso
n Kg ha−1 n kg ha−1
All contact farmers 11 55.3 (11.7) 10 48.6 (12.4)
Farmers supplying seed
in 1998
5 75.4 (21.2)* 3 78.9 (10.6)*
Farmers not supplying
seed in 1998
6 38.5 (10.9)* 6 24.9 (12.2)*
*Differences Between Those Supplying Seed or Not Significant at p<0.05
Table 3 Means of Some Characteristics of Farmers in West Harerghe Who Stated in Surveys that They Had Supplied or Had Received Seed Off-
farm in 1998
Farmer Characteristic Chiro Miesso
Received in 1998 Gave/sold in 1998 Received in 1998 Gave/sold in 1998
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number responding 6 47 19 34 9 32 9 32
Amount given / received (kg) 13.0 – 32.4 – 18.5 – 35.3 –
Number given to – – 5.8 – – – 4.7 –
Age of farmer 35.83 37.62 41.68** 35.03** 36.44 35.34 39.33 34.53
Family size 5.00 6.72 6.89 6.32 7.11 6.50 7.33 6.44
Number of oxen 0.83* 1.35* 1.39 1.24 1.89** 1.16** 2.33** 1.03**
Area farmed (Timad)a 5.17 5.13 5.42 4.97 9.22 10.41 13.78** 9.12**
Area planted to sorghum (Timad)a 4.67 4.24 4.76 4.03 7.44 7.09 10.00** 6.38**
Seed saved/area to sorghum (kg ha−1) 24.00 30.93 30.88 32.91 36.78 31.26 27.37 31.71
Expected production, good year (t) 1.27 1.28 1.71** 1.03** 1.30 1.93 2.86** 1.49**
Expected production, bad year (t) 0.41 0.39 0.53** 0.32** 0.17** 0.30** 0.44** 0.22**
Expected yield, good year (t/ha) 2.13 2.64 3.02** 2.33** 1.42** 2.36** 2.28 2.12
Expected yield, bad year (t ha−1) 0.71 0.84 0.95 0.75 0.22* 0.38* 0.41 0.33
‘Age’ of seed stocks on-farm (yrs) 7.67** 12.98** 14.5** 10.9** 4.11** 11.30** 15.00** 8.23**
a Timad is a Local Unit of Area, Roughly 1/8 of a Hectare; Means of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ Responses Different at * p<0.1 and ** p<0.05
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around timing, quantity, and adaptability. Preferences also
diverged with some farmer characteristics, suggesting that
structural factors affect access to seed from different sources.
Reasons given for these preferences broaden our view of
accessibility, and raise practical issues for seed system
interventions or emergency seed relief.
Most Preferred Sources
Table 4 lists responses. For both the most- and least-
preferred sources, proportions differed significantly (p<
0.05) between locations. Other farmers were a more
popular source in the highlands than the lowlands, while
merchants were less popular in the highlands. Those
preferring farmers as sources highlighted favorable terms
(especially in Chiro), or adaptation to local conditions
(mainly in Miesso) as reasons for this. Some others,
particularly in Chiro, stressed values around reciprocity
and trust (“we know them”, “we give to each other”).
Most of those preferring merchants cited the ease and speed
of obtaining seed, provided one has cash. The implication,
explicitly made by some Miesso farmers, is that requesting
seed from neighbors is slow and cumbersome, with supply by
no means certain. Transaction costs for seeking seed from
neighbors is itself a significant barrier for some, though poor
seed availability may also be an issue. Those preferring
government-supplied seed highlighted the government’s role
in seed provision or the (physical) quality of the seed provided.
Least Preferred Sources
A higher proportion of Miesso farmers disliked the
government as a source, while farmers in Chiro were
relatively more negative about merchants. The formal
sector does not produce much sorghum seed, and has
virtually no capacity for multiplying lowland sorghum
types. Late delivery was the most common complaint given
about government supply (e.g. “We will be starving a year
before getting seed.”). Some, mainly in Miesso, complained
that requirements for channeling requests and delivery
through FA councils increased stress and delays.
Themost common reason for disliking other farmers related
to unreliability. A number complained that neighbors would
promise to provide seed, but then fail to do so (i.e. maintaining
the form of local norms, but not the content). Several of those
who disliked merchants cited high prices, though five Chiro
farmers highlighted the immorality of selling seed in general,
something not raised by Miesso farmers.
Patterns of Preferences
Farmer views on seed sources are complex, with no clear
consensus on good or bad sources. However, some patterns
are discernable. For instance, some Chiro farmers high-
lighted the accessibility and adaptability of farmer-supplied
seed, while Miesso emphasized the speed and ease of
obtaining seed from merchants. Different views on neigh-
bors and markets to some degree reflect agroecological
factors. For instance, highly-localized rain failure in the
lowlands can affect seed availability for a locality, under-
mining farmers’ capacity to supply their neighbors. How-
ever, some farmers also emphasized more ‘social’ reasons
for their preferences. For instance, while Chiro farmers’
ambivalence about merchants may involve a number of
issues, several justified their hostility with normative
statements about the value of community solidarity, or the
moral dubiousness of commercial transactions with seed.
Markets are important sources of seed in the lowlands, and
attracted less opprobrium. Rather, Miesso farmers were
relatively less positive about farmer–farmer seed exchange,
complaining of delays or tedious social entanglements.
Characteristics of farmers were compared by preference.
Those preferring government in Chiro expected significantly
higher harvests, saved more seed, and had more oxen,
suggesting this group is more productive and better-off than
average (Table 5). This echoes the ‘progressive’ farmers
sought by extension package promotion. Indeed, the wealth-
ier focus group in Chiro felt confident in approaching the
Ministry of Agriculture for seed, while a group of their poorer
neighbors stated that farmers like them did not have access to
the government for seed, and they would do better to go to
market. Moreover, highland farmers preferring merchants
appear poorer in terms of oxen-ownership. New technologies,
or emergency seed assistance, are often delivered through
formal supply channels, so it is a concern if poorer farmers
actually do have restricted access to these channels.
Table 4 Farmers’ Views of the
Best and Worst Sources for
Off-farm Sorghum Seed, From
Survey
Seed source Best source Worst source
Chiro Miesso Chiro Miesso
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Other farmers 28 53.8 14 38.9 7 18.4 3 12.0
Merchants 8 15.4 14 38.9 19 50.0 6 24.0
Government 16 30.8 8 22.2 12 31.6 16 64.0
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In contrast to Chiro, Miesso farmers preferring govern-
ment seed had fewer oxen, smaller sorghum fields, and
lower production expectations in poor years than others,
highlighting the vulnerability of this group (Table 6). The
poor are more likely to need large quantities of seed on a
regular basis, which would be costly for many farmers to
meet. Those who considered merchants the worst source
also appeared poorer according to the measures, suggesting
problems of access to cash. However, poorer farmers
preferring government supply may be expressing more
hope than expectation, given the government’s poor record
here, and its bias towards better-off farmers in develop-
mental programs. The view of the state as supplier of last
resort is also supported by the fact that those preferring it
the least had more available resources than other farmers.
Comments in focus groups and interviews suggest that
significant transaction costs are involved in obtaining seed
from a neighbor. In light of this, it is interesting that Miesso
farmers who viewed neighbors as the best source had
significantly more oxen; sharing oxen with others can
cement close (though possibly unequal) ties, and this may
help these farmers secure access to seed from neighbors.
Patterns of preferences differ between highland and
lowland, but the evidence suggests that different prefer-
ences reflect differences in socially-mediated access to
seed. The following section explores the link between seed
exchange, social networks, and norms in more detail.
Seed Exchange and Social Networks
Several facts support the notion that seed exchange is
closely linked to social networks and to norms of
reciprocity. First, publicly-expressed norms encourage
unconditional assistance to neighbors, especially those
lacking basic inputs. As one farmer exclaimed, he provided
seed to many others because, “Our father said that seed and
oxen should go to those who ask.” Others cited Islamic
values of charity.
Secondly, Oromo society encourages strong associative
ties. Links between neighbors and friends have as much of
a role in social organization as networks based solely on
kinship, which facilitates the incorporation of outsiders into
Oromo society (Lewis 1975; Bulcha 1996; Blackhurst
1996). The main form of governance used to be via gada,
an age-grade system where a cohort takes on leadership
roles around the age of 40, passing to the next cohort every
eight years (Blackhurst 1978). Though the gada system has
declined, the egalitarian principles it symbolized remain
important in Oromo societies (Bulcha 1996; Bassi 1994).
Thirdly, mutual-aid institutions are common. These take
many forms, such as edir for labor-sharing, inyi for oxen-
sharing, or gosa, which originate in clans (Ta’a 1996;
Tesfaye 1961). Work teams are common for tasks such as
weeding or harvest, where the host generally supplies food
and chat (Catha edulis, a local stimulant) in exchange for a
day’s unpaid work.
Relationships of mutual support also exist in West
Harerghe in the form of patron-client ties. The 1975 land
reform removed extreme wealth differences among rural
households (Rahmato 1985), and did away with feudal
powers, though structural differences persist. For instance,
many lack oxen and so must work for someone owning an
oxen team to be able to plow their land (generally five
days’ labor for every day of the team; ICRA 1996). While
Table 5 Some Characteristics of Surveyed Farmers in Chiro, According to Their Preferences for Off-farm Seed
Farmer characteristic Most preferred source Least preferred source
Other farmer Merchant Govern-ment pa Other farmer Merchant Govern-ment Pa
Number responding 28 8 16 7 19 12
Number of oxen 1.15AB 0.50B 1.38A * 1.43 1.28 0.67 NS
Seed saved/ sorghum area (kg ha−1) 23.96AB 21.50B 46.44A ** 45.86 21.67 18.67 NS
Expected production, good year (t) 1.09B 1.19AB 1.63A ** 1.46 1.39 1.12 NS
aMeans of all three sources different at *p<0.1 and **p<0.05, different letters indicating differences between individual sources
Table 6 Some Characteristics of Surveyed Farmers in Miesso, According to Their Preferences for Off-farm Seed
Farmer characteristic Most preferred source Least preferred source
Other farmer Merchant Govern-ment pa Other farmer Merchant Govern-ment pa
Number responding 14 14 8 3 6 16
Number of oxen 2.15A 1.07B 0.63B ** 0.67 0.67 1.63 NS
Area planted to sorghum (Timad) 7.21AB 8.43A 4.50B ** 6.00AB 4.00B 8.56A **
Expected production, bad year (t) 0.30AB 0.34A 0.12B * 0.27AB 0.08B 0.38A *
aMeans of all three sources different at *p<0.1 and **p<0.05, different letters indicating differences between individual sources
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this arrangement allows them to farm, they inevitably sow
late in the planting window (with a tired team), and crop
yield suffers. Land cannot be sold, so land rental and share-
cropping are common arrangements; while informal, these
often involve contractual relationships. These examples
alert us to the fact that patron–client relationships can be
inequitable, involving coercion as well as cooperation.
Patrons may offer support, but in turn benefit from clients’
labor, or support in their projects. The local FA adminis-
tration, its committees, and mass organizations wield
considerable local power, for instance deciding on the (re)
allocation of plots to households, identifying aid beneficia-
ries, and administering collective public works. FA leaders
are local farmers, and having a broad base of support can
help appointment; socially prominent farmers (sometimes
with honorific titles such as “Hajji”) were often known for
giving seed to neighbors. At a higher level of government,
a Federal Member of Parliament living a few km from the
Chiro study site was renowned for his generosity with seed,
and many traveled to him to seek assistance.
Finally, Table 3 suggests that seed suppliers and
recipients are distinct groups, with the latter being
considerably more vulnerable (vulnerability is explored in
more detail in McGuire 2007). Taken together, social norms
stipulating that nobody should be denied seed, traditions of
mutual aid, patron–client relationships, and the links
between seed insecurity and vulnerability suggest that seed
exchange is closely linked to social networks. Thus access
to seed, and the precise nature of this access (e.g. quantity
or terms of supply) is embedded in a wider set of social
relationships between actors. This has important implica-
tions for seed security—and ultimately the well-being—of
the poorest. The following sections explore details of access
and relationships.
Amount of Seed Exchanged
Farmers seeking seed often require 10 kg or more to (re)sow
their plots. Many farmers would not find this a trivial amount
to provide. Most would only be certain they could spare seed
once their own fields were established. This may be too late
for others, particularly in the lowlands where the window for
sowing is small. Grain could be given, but generally is not
suitable for use as seed. Thus, if a needy farmer desires a
substantial amount of seed on short notice, only those who
had saved large amounts (100 kg or more) would be certain
of having spare seed. Such individuals generally include the
most successful farmers and prominent individuals.
Terms of Exchange
Terms of supply influence accessibility. While family
members usually provide seed as a free gift, markets
generally require cash. The terms of supply from other
farmers vary: while one kg (e.g. to try a new variety) is
usually free, cash or grain (at 1:1 exchange) may be
requested for larger amounts, depending upon the nature of
the relationship and transaction. Poorer farmers in focus
groups indicated that cash payment would be difficult for
them, something confirmed by socially-disaggregated stud-
ies in other regions (e.g. David and Sperling 1999).
Exchanging grain is another possibility, but the chronic
seed insecure usually have little grain remaining by sowing
time. Thus, the poorest farmers rely on getting seed for free.
In public settings, farmers usually held to normative
ideals, pronouncing that seed exchange among them was
free and unconditional. However, terms are portrayed
differently, depending on the speaker. For example, a focus
group of wealthier farmers in Chiro insisted that older
farmers still gave out seed for free, though they acknowl-
edged that younger farmers now seek cash. In a separate
session, their poorer neighbors disagreed, insisting that
most exchanges required cash, and not only from younger
farmers. An example in Miesso supports the latter view.
One farmer, placed in the wealthiest category by his
neighbors in two separate wealth-ranking exercises, was
one of the very few in the area who had saved seed of a
fast-maturing variety. Thus his seed was in great demand
when the belg rains failed in 1998; rather than give it away,
he sold 100 kg at the market rate of 2 Birr/kg (≈US$0.25).
Though it would be difficult to establish how terms have
changed for every transaction, two points are raised here.
One is that portrayals of generosity differ between public
and private settings, and between wealthier and poorer
farmers. There are strategic incentives for exaggerating:
suppliers can play up their patron credentials by over-
stating their generosity, while the seed needy may bolster
their claims to support by pointing to others’ stinginess. As
Scott (1985) showed, representations of wealth or generos-
ity lie at the heart of debates within cultures of exchange,
used strategically to press norm-based claims (e.g. “you can
afford to give me seed”, or “you can afford to buy your
own”). The second point is that norms may be in transition,
away from gifts towards more transaction-based exchanges.
Publicly-expressed norms may simply be residual polite-
ness, covering a changing situation underneath. Seed
exchange elsewhere has moved from gift-based to more
commercial transactions (e.g. Sperling and Loevinsohn
1993), which raises the question for West Harerghe: since
many farmers agree that the extent of free gifts is declining,
is the culture of mutual aid also in decline?
Acute vs. Chronic Need
Emergency aid distinguishes acute emergencies from more
chronic vulnerability due to poverty (Sperling and Cooper
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2003). This distinction is also relevant with farmer–farmer
exchanges. Acute problems, such as widespread germina-
tion failure due to late rains may spur a relatively
unconditional response from those able to assist. Yet
chronically insecure households tend to need seed even
during normal seasons, and may not be able to count upon
automatic support. For example, a chronically seed-
insecure farmer, whose belg sowing had failed, claimed
he would not continue with sorghum that season, as he
could not borrow or purchase seed. A (wealthier) neighbor
who was also present chided him for not selling his last
goat to raise cash for seed purchase. Some farmers hesitated
approaching their neighbors for seed assistance, perhaps
fearing being branded ‘lazy’ or ‘poor farmers’ for always
needing seed. Some poorer farmers in India (Dhamotharan
et al. 1997) and Honduras (C. Almekinders, personal
communication, 2001) prefer the market to asking neigh-
bors, to avoid such moral stigma.
Chronic stress also affects the capacity for social
support. Mutual aid may increase in the early phases of a
crisis, but if it persists over time, support tends to become
more constrained and short-term in nature as assets are
steadily depleted (Dirks 1980). This may be occurring in
West Harerghe, as we now know that the 1998–1999
season was part of the build-up to the ‘slow onset’ food and
seed crises of 1999–2000 (Hammond and Maxwell 2002)
and 2002–2003. However, normative elements may also be
at play, since the poorest tended to diversify into off-farm
activities to cope with uncertainty, which often meant
neglecting their own farms’ management. Several promi-
nent seed donors spoke disparagingly of such ‘part-time
farmers’ and their weed-riddled plots, suggesting they saw
them as less worthy of assistance.
Form vs. Content
An outward form of assistance may differ from the content
actually provided (Scott 1985). Content for seed exchange
may relate to amounts, quality, or even attitudes around
seed exchange. Gifts of very small quantities are quite
common: in 1998, three of the poorest contact farmers had
received 1 kg from six or more different sources each.
These may be token gifts to maintain appearances, or reflect
requests limited to quantities usually given as free gifts.
Seed is rarely completely unavailable, so such strategic
restraint from petitioners or donors highlights the social
nature of this transaction.
Farmers know that sorghum stored as grain makes poor
quality, low-germination seed. Thus, receiving ‘seed’ that
was actually stored grain is considered unfair dealing. A
few farmers voiced complaints to this effect, though not
open accusations. Wealthier highland farmers, in a focus
group, downplayed this possibility, arguing that everyone
should be able to distinguish sorghum seed from stored
grain. Even if true, there remains the issue of the ability of
poor farmers to protest against low quality seed, especially
when received as a gift. Richards (1986) noted that
indebted rice farmers in Sierra Leone often received seed
contaminated with undesirable, semi-weedy seed. Again,
behind the rhetoric of universal support, actual practice may
be somewhat different.
Finally, there are normative expectations of form around
attitude and behavior. Farmers publicly claim they would
supply to any needy neighbor, but some talk privately of
‘deserving’ as opposed to ‘lazy’ poor. Making every effort
to obtain seed by their own means (such as selling their last
goat), or working on their farms throughout the season is
seen as a virtue. This chimes with government interest in
promoting self-reliance, and in restricting development
programmes (including the provision of scarce MV seed)
to ‘full-time farmers.’ So-called ‘part-time’ farmers are
generally pursuing off-farm livelihood activities to limit
their vulnerability to crop failure, yet are castigated as
‘lazy’ by officials, such as the coordinator of agricultural
development in Miesso woreda. Thus moral judgments also
come to bear on a household’s farming practices, with
disputes affecting access to seed.
Social Relationships
Seed access is influenced by ties to potential donors. In
terms of frequency of use for seed exchange, family
members appear less important than unrelated farmers.
Cooperative activities in other spheres, such as labor- or
oxen-sharing, or shared membership in local institutions
such as edir, can help cement strong ties between farmers
for seed exchange, though relationships may still be
unequal. Elsewhere in Ethiopia, local institutions have been
used as a conduit for seed distribution (Pratten 1997). The
small Amhara minority in Chiro offers an example of how
seed exchange follows social networks. The interview
sample included four Amharas who supplied seed to others
in 1998: all nine of their named recipients were also
Amhara. For four Amhara seed recipients, two of their six
suppliers were Amhara. This is not to stress ethnic divisions
(Amhara farmers have very friendly ties with their Oromo
neighbors) but shows how seed exchange follows other
social networks—in this case, reflecting ethnic and reli-
gious ties. These social networks clearly affect patterns of
dissemination.
The survey did not inquire whether seed recipients had
the same supplier from year to year, so it is not possible to
assess how common stable patronage is with seed.
However, evidence reveals some close associations be-
tween donors and recipients. For instance, one informant
gave 3–5 kg to the same three chronically seed-insecure
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farmers every year. In several other cases, seed donors
named individual recipients of their seed who were visiting
them at the time of the interview, and chewing their chat
during a work break. Chat has luxury status, since nearly all
farmers would like to chew it during breaks, but few can
afford its regular purchase. Sharing chat with others can
help cement ties, for instance lowering transaction costs for
obtaining reliable labor. Thus the fact that some recipients
are receiving chat as well as seed from a donor is an
indicator of close social ties—though these ties likely
involve expectations from the recipients (such as providing
labor on short notice). Share-cropping, another example of
a potentially unequal relationship, also sometimes bundles
seed loans along with other obligations between parties.
These instances show how seed exchange can be embedded
in other social relationships.
Following from this is the question of social exclusion.
Elsewhere, those not participating in collective work
activities, or whose contributions were seen as indifferent,
were effectively shut out from mutual support in times of
need (Adams 1993; Richards 1986). In West Harerghe,
some households allocate very little time to collective work
activities, due to poverty, age, illness, or simply inclination
(Wilbaux 1986). This group tends to also include the ‘part-
time farmers’ mentioned above. Might these households be
less likely to obtain seed or receive favorable terms?
Normative comments about undeserving farmers suggests
this is a possibility.
Discussion
Seed access is a critical feature of farmer systems, yet there
has been little study of how access may vary within a
community. Timely access to sufficient amounts of good
quality off-farm seed is important for many farmers’
livelihoods, since unpredictable environmental conditions
mean that many frequently need seed. Access to seed
through exchange also affects the movement of new
varieties (and associated information) through the farmer
system (Bellon 2004; Badstue 2006). This study shows
how access is embedded in wider social relationships.
Social networks involving local labor-exchange institutions
such as edir or gosa, as well as the multifaceted ties among
households involved in share-cropping or in loaning oxen,
influence who has access to seed, and access conditions.
Social exchange theories offer a useful framework for
analyzing seed exchange by placing transactions in a wider
context. Gaining status through providing material support
appears to motivate some of the larger donors, for instance.
Also, the moral economy concept usefully draws attention
to cultural norms around assistance, especially between
households that regularly have surplus seed, and those that
are chronically seed-insecure. Social networks can help us
understand how seed access varies between individuals, as
well as over time. However, social networks and reciprocal
ties do not guarantee access for all needy farmers, possibly
because the culture of assistance is changing. This
challenges the uncritical assumption, held by many
researchers and officials in Ethiopia, that mutual-aid is as
generous and unconditional as farmers publicly proclaim.
Farmer preferences for off-farm seed sources show how
access to seed integrates a number of different concerns.
Financial cost, timing, quantity, and adaptation to agro-
ecological conditions are all important for rating one source
over another. As Tables 4, 5 and 6 show, preferences differ
according to district, as well as other household character-
istics. For instance, drought stress in the lowlands partly
explains why more farmers prefer merchants in Miesso; the
government has little capacity for supplying MV seed for
the lowlands, and few farmers can spare the quantities
needed to re-sow an entire plot. Chiro farmers preferring
government owned more oxen and had more secure
harvests; their preferences may reflect better access due to
higher social standing. While ecology and social structure
are important influences on farmers’ preferences for seed
exchange, farmers continue to supply the majority of off-
farm seed (McGuire 2007). Thus, membership in social
networks matters a great deal for seed dissemination. A
number of farmers referred to the ease or difficulty of social
transactions with other farmers as a reason for preferring
neighbors or market sources, respectively. Seed is a limited
resource, and the quality of social ties affect the nature of
access to seed.
Does support with seed help the poorest to cope with
difficult conditions, or does it bind them to fundamentally
disempowering relationships? Richards (1986) in Sierra
Leone, and Watts (1983) in Nigeria drew rather different
conclusions about seed loans from wealthy farmers. Watts
argued that these exchanges further marginalized the poor,
since they repaid seed loans with labor to the detriment of
their own livelihoods. Richards took a more benign view of
patronage around seed, as he considered that these loans
enabled, rather than constrained, production (1990). This
study shares the latter view, as land reform and blocks on
land sales make Ethiopian rural society less stratified than
Sierra Leone’s or Nigeria’s, and weak market development
means that better-off farmers cannot enrich themselves to a
point where they could break free of local social networks.
Even high-profile farmers need their neighbors’ goodwill
and support. Social networks are not necessarily egalitarian,
but seed assistance does not appear to be linked to crude
exploitation in this study area. However, Hyden (2006)
points out that structural power can mean the better-off can
sometime renege on a commitment to offer assistance.
Farmers certainly did report being denied seed from
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potential donors, but the latter always claimed their own
stock was already exhausted. Whether or not such excuses
are genuine, assistance often is denied; giving material or
non-material assistance to a potential donor may increase
the chance of receiving seed in the future, but access is not
necessarily guaranteed.
Cultural norms and morals infuse social networks.
Poorer households tend to engage more in off-farm
activities to secure their livelihoods (Sharp and Devereux
2004), leaving less time to maintain reciprocal ties through
participation in labor-sharing groups or other activities.
Such households risk being seen as less deserving of
charity, especially since a farm-centric view of livelihoods
held by many farmers (and officials) also casts a negative
light over part-time farmers. The tendency for the poorest to
prefer seed sources other than their neighbors suggests a
measure of social exclusion. Social marginalization is also
an issue with emergency seed assistance, since in Ethiopia
FA councils often identify beneficiaries and distribute aid
(Bramel et al. 2004). Households lacking strong links to
social networks are less likely to be nominated for
assistance by their neighbors. Thus poor households that
are also socially-marginalized are especially vulnerable.
Local markets play an important role in seed exchange.
This is especially the case in the lowlands when widespread
rain failure reduces the availability of seed from other
farmers. Some farmers claim that markets are growing in
importance in seed supply, while amounts supplied for free
from other farmers are decreasing. Such changes could be
because chronic environmental stress has reduced farmers’
capacity, but not their desire, to offer generous support
(Hammond and Maxwell 2002; Dirks 1980). Indeed, many
farmers, as well as government and NGO officials, claim
that the culture of mutual assistance remains strong.
However, static portrayals of culture deny subjects’ agency
in shaping, and changing, norms around resources
(Agrawal 2003; Brosius 1997). Cultural changes may also
be causing support networks to narrow, or even break down
in West Harerghe, increasing the role of merchants and non-
gift exchanges. The greater level of hostility towards
merchants and non-gift exchange in the highlands (Table 4),
and the couching of this hostility in moral terms, could
indicate that the culture of mutual aid remains robust in the
highlands. However, it could be that these views reflect
resistance to this culture’s decline, something which the
focus group of poorer farmers in Chiro claimed was
happening. Clearly, cultural norms around mutual aid are a
site of contestation and debate, which influences how more
commercial transactions are viewed.
This study underscores the centrality of seed access to
farmers’ livelihoods. This has important lessons for
interventions that wish to work with or support farmer
seed systems. For instance, the emerging view in emergen-
cy seed relief is that seed is usually available locally
following a crisis, and that farmers’ main constraint is
accessing this seed (Remington et al. 2002; Sperling et al.
2006). This study concurs that access is a significant
challenge to poor farmers, but cautions against assuming
that a single intervention can improve access for all.
Preferences for off-farm seed sources vary considerably
within communities and between agroecologies, and a
single channel, such as local markets, may not be
acceptable to all. Where the cash economy and formal seed
supply channels are weak, such as in West Harerghe,
farmer-farmer exchange will remain important for house-
hold seed security. An emergency intervention that gives
vouchers or cash to vulnerable households, so that they can
purchase the seed they desire, will likely only address
access in the short term.2 Close ties to suppliers, possibly
involving exchange in other areas (e.g. land, labor, oxen),
will still be needed to secure access to farmer–farmer
exchange. Poor households unable or unwilling to invest in
building social ties, or deemed unworthy of assistance due
to their livelihood (e.g. part-time farmers), risk being
marginalized from social support networks. Emergency
interventions are unlikely to make much of an impact on
farmers here; targeted assistance to vulnerable households
will be needed, and possibly more direct engagement with
exchange relations and norms.
Farmer seed systems play a central role in agricultural
livelihoods. This article argues that the social dimensions of
seed systems are as important as the biophysical aspects,
and that access to seed merits greater attention in seed
system analyses. This study uses empirical study of seed
exchange to shed light on how access to seed varies within
and between communities. Structure is important, as
households with more resources tend to supply seed to
neighbors in need, but so are cultural norms, as they serve
as a backdrop to the social networks and reciprocal aid
relationships which play an important role in seed dissem-
ination. Thus, despite exogenous forces, such as environ-
mental stress or government programs, social networks
continue to matter. Norms are areas of contestation, used by
different actors to press claims on resources. This means
norms are dynamic, and there is evidence that non-gift
exchange is growing in importance in West Harerghe.
Greater understanding how farmers secure access, and
which aspects of access matter, can aid interventions with
farmer seed systems.
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